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Introduction 
 
 
Russian Energy Supplies to Europe 
The Crimea Crisis: Mutual Dependency, Lasting Collateral Damage and 
Strategic Alternatives for the European Union 
Kirsten Westphal 
At least in the medium term Russia will remain the backbone of Europe’s energy supply. 
While the European Union possesses enough storage capacity to bridge a temporary 
interruption of gas supplies routed through Ukraine, it has precious few other immedi-
ate alternatives. In the medium to long term, however, Europe has diversification options 
that would also expand its foreign policy leeway. Overall, strong reciprocal dependen-
cies and economic rationality should mitigate against allowing the political conflict to 
spread into economic and energy relations. Otherwise both sides will suffer massive 
economic harm. 
 
There is great concern that the Crimea 
annexation, looming military escalation 
and continuing destabilisation could 
interfere with gas supplies to and through 
Ukraine. Also that the escalating spiral of 
sanctions and retaliation between Russia 
and the West could spread to affect the 
energy trade. If economic rationality pre-
vailed on both sides, neither Russia not the 
European Union would have any interest 
in endangering energy relations. Today, 
however, political interests diametrically 
oppose vital economic interests. What does 
that mean for the reliability of Russian 
energy supplies, so widely touted in Ger-
many? In cold objective terms, Russia has 
exploited its energy exports in pursuit of 
its political interests. Nowhere can that be 
better observed than in Ukraine. 
Gas Dispute Reloaded? 
The gas conflict between Moscow and Kiev 
follows a familiar pattern. To predict the 
spiral of escalation one need only recapitu-
late the Russian-Ukrainian gas crises of 2006 
and 2009. In 2013 Ukraine imported 25.8 
billion cubic metres from Russia towards a 
total annual consumption of 50.3 billion 
cubic metres. The delivery contract of 2009, 
which is valid until 2019, is unfavourable 
for Kiev because of its comparatively high 
prices and sweeping minimum take-or-pay 
clauses, while the transit agreement con-
cluded at the same time grants Gazprom 
great flexibility. However, in 2010 and 2013 
Moscow granted price and volume reduc-
tions in return for political concessions 
such as an extension of the lease on Russia’s 
Crimean base for its Black Sea Fleet until 
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 2042 and Kiev’s rejection of the association 
agreement with the European Union. 
(As of March 21) Moscow now demands 
settlement of debts amounting to almost 
$2 billion and reinstatement of the higher 
monopoly price ($406 instead of $268.50 
per thousand cubic metres) as of April 2014. 
Russia has the contractual power to switch 
to payment in advance in the event of 
default, and to cut deliveries. It has already 
threatened to do so. In order to remove that 
pretext for delivery cuts, the West has an 
interest in Kiev honouring its debts. The gas 
contract gives Moscow a number of levers 
to maintain pressure on Ukraine, with gas 
supplies offering a means of further desta-
bilisation. Moreover, now that Ukraine has 
lost its bargaining chip of the long-term 
lease on the naval base at Sevastopol as 
the quid pro quo for gas deliveries, Russian 
newspapers are already reporting that 
gas prices could rise as high as $480 per 
thousand cubic metres. 
If the European Union wishes to help the 
almost bankrupt Ukraine, it will have to 
engage in resolving the country’s enormous 
energy problems – but will also have to 
demand reforms. It is foreseeable that Kiev 
will have to inflict higher energy prices on 
the population, and that in a precarious 
socio-economic situation. 
In the short term the European Union 
has limited options for supplying Ukraine 
with gas via alternative routes. Fundamen-
tally reverse flow modifications could be 
installed. The German company RWE could 
play a key role here. In 2013 2.1 billion 
cubic metres of gas were supplied by revers-
ing the flow from Poland and Hungary to 
Ukraine. But it would take until winter 
2014/15 before a physical reverse flow op-
tion for 10 billion cubic metres/year could 
come on stream at the Slovak-Ukrainian 
border, and even then it would still be 
Russian gas being diverted. 
The largest transport corridor for Rus-
sian gas to Europe runs through Ukraine. 
According to the International Energy 
Agency, half of Russia’s 160 billion cubic 
metres of natural gas exports pass through 
Ukraine to Europe. Germany and most 
western European states would be able to 
largely absorb an interruption on this 
corridor – for whatever reason – for about 
three months. Storage facilities everywhere 
are full after the mild winter. But the stor-
age facilities would have to start being 
replenished from June at the latest, other-
wise the shortage shifts threateningly to 
the next winter. Transport alternatives are 
offered by Nord Stream to Greifswald (ca-
pacity 55 billion cubic metres/year) capacity 
and the Yamal pipeline through Belarus 
to the Baltic states, Poland and Germany 
(capacity 33 billion cubic metres). And then 
there is Blue Stream from Russia to Turkey, 
with a capacity of 16 billion cubic metres. 
But even under this scenario, south-eastern 
Europe and Italy would suffer, because of 
their lack of diversion options. 
Otherwise, the short-term substitution 
alternatives are very limited. This applies in 
particular to electricity generation, where 
coal is already increasingly used. While 
Europe does have terminals for importing 
liquefied natural gas (LNG), the global LNG 
spot market is small, at 5 billion cubic me-
tres per month (indeed, this is less than the 
6 billion cubic metres routed via Ukraine). 
Russia’s Energy Exports to the 
European Union 
Russia is Europe’s main energy supplier. 
About 30 percent of the Union’s gas con-
sumption and 35 percent of its oil imports 
come from Russia. Germany’s import-depen-
dency is even slightly higher, with 36 percent 
and almost 39 percent respectively. Recent-
ly EU gas imports from Russia rose again. 
Of course Russia is also heavily depend-
ent on financial revenues from its energy 
exports. Oil and gas make up almost 70 per-
cent of Russian exports, with most going to 
Europe. Here there are differences between 
oil and gas. Natural gas contributes only 
about 5 percent of the state budget. Although 
Gazprom would suffer if it lost income 
from Europe and Ukraine, those revenues 
are no longer required to cross-subsidise 
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 consumer prices in Russia. These days Gaz-
prom turns a profit in the domestic market. 
And as the Russian market becomes more 
attractive, Gazprom now has to compete 
with Rosneft and Novatek. On the other 
hand revenues from the oil sector are much 
more important for the state budget, where 
they contribute almost 50 percent. It has 
been estimated that Russia needs an oil 
price of about $115 per barrel to secure a 
balanced budget in 2014. Nervousness and 
alarm play into the hands of (Russian) pro-
ducers and traders. 
But to what extent does economic ration-
ality still determine the Kremlin’s policies? 
Putin could also use economic sanctions 
as an excuse for poor economic data: eco-
nomic growth was already slowing, capital 
outflows increasing, and industrial pro-
duction stagnating. The dollar exchange 
rate for the rouble has plummeted to a 
historic low. The $87.3 billion in the state 
reserve fund give Russia a certain cushion. 
There is a dense network of business 
links along the entire energy supply chain, 
especially between Russia and Germany. 
Russian companies like Gazprom and Ros-
neft have purchased important assets in the 
European market, where they are especially 
active in trading and distribution. In Ger-
many Gazprom is currently in the process 
of taking over Wingas and its gas storage 
facilities, while the oligarch Friedman is 
buying RWE DEA. Rosneft owns stakes in 
refineries. This not only contradicts the 
spirit of “unbundling”, but especially in 
the present situation demands intensified 
scrutiny and effective control. Conversely, 
Western firms also generally have central 
production interests in Russia. 
Alternative Sources 
A broad diversification to significantly 
reduce the Russian share could only be 
accomplished incrementally and would 
take years or even more than a decade, 
depending on the option. But to do so, 
Germany within the European Union 
would have to set the process in motion 
today, which would in itself send an impor-
tant message to Moscow. Russia’s world mar-
ket shares are significant, with almost 13 
percent for oil and over 17 percent for natu-
ral gas, and would not be substitutable. But 
all other major consumers either draw a 
large proportion of their supplies from the 
Persian Gulf, as is the case in Asia, or like 
the United States possess a domestic buffer 
against external energy crises and price 
spikes. In the event of supply cutbacks 
Europe would draw the short straw, because 
it receives so much of its oil and gas from 
Russia. In the case of oil Europe has stra-
tegic reserves, and because oil is largely 
used in the transport sector certain ratio-
nalisation options are conceivable. With gas 
the vulnerability is much greater. In Germa-
ny natural gas accounts for 22.5 percent of 
the primary energy mix. Almost 50 percent 
of Germany’s domestic heat and 47 percent 
of industrial process energy are covered by 
gas, but currently only 10.5 percent of elec-
tricity generation. Nonetheless, there are 
system-relevant gas-fired power stations, 
especially in southern Germany. The figures 
speak for themselves: Germany’s electricity 
and heat supply would be endangered. 
In the medium term Europe is depend-
ent on Russia’s gas deliveries. Since the 
post-Fukushima demand boost in 2011 the 
supply situation for LNG in the European 
Union has tightened again. The gas market 
is more than 80 percent pipeline-bound, 
and the traditional suppliers Norway, Rus-
sia and Algeria continue to play a central 
role. However Algeria has reached its pro-
duction plateau and demand is growing 
rapidly across North Africa. Norway has a 
certain leeway, but here too there are lim-
its. Moreover, transport bottlenecks within 
the European network prevent Norwegian 
gas from reaching (southern) eastern Europe. 
The Netherlands recently set an annual pro-
duction limit of 40 billion cubic metres for 
the Groningen gas field. There, as in Germa-
ny, domestic production is falling. As import 
dependency grows the chances of respond-
ing flexibly to crisis by increasing domestic 
production fall dramatically. 
SWP Comments 16 
March 2014 
3 
 The LNG supply is certain to improve 
successively from 2016/17, when US and 
Australian LNG in particular come onto the 
market, and the relative supply shortage 
should be overcome by 2020. But this gas 
will be expensive: on the Asian spot market 
prices already reach $19 per MBtu, in Europe 
only $10,50. Much will thus depend on 
the development of demand in Asia, where 
Russia is also pushing into the East Asian 
market with LNG and oil exports. In Europe’s 
neighbourhood there are gas fields in the 
eastern Mediterranean, the Caspian region 
and North Africa. With respect to the latter, 
a renewable energy and gas partnership 
would be an obvious option. Germany and 
the European Union also have possibilities 
to make the system more robust through 
energy saving, efficiency improvements and 
a broader energy mix. Ambitious climate 
goals should be leveraged to advance those 
objectives. Not least, the heat and transport 
sectors need to be included in the trans-
formation of the energy system. In terms 
of security of supply the quickest and 
cheapest moves have already been made in 
the EU, in the wake of the 2009 gas crisis. 
Now it is time to push for construction of 
the LNG terminal at Wilhelmshaven and 
connecting LNG terminals to the German 
network. Strategic reserves, clear respon-
sibilities and commercial stockpiling obli-
gations, but also easier implementation of 
integrated strategic production and trans-
port projects are the next steps to make. 
That would require a European consensus. 
Conclusions 
The relationship to Russia and the Russian-
Ukrainian gas conflicts have always been a 
fulcrum and flashpoint of common foreign 
and energy policy. If the Ukraine/Crimea 
crisis drags on the consensus among EU 
member-states may prove difficult to up-
hold. But however the member-states may 
drift apart over these controversial ques-
tions, the EU Commission already plays a 
growing de facto role in the bilateral rela-
tionship with Russia. Thorny questions 
such as South Stream, the third internal 
market package and anti-trust proceedings 
against Gazprom are all matters for Brus-
sels. Energy foreign policy is determined less 
by national capitals than is commonly per-
ceived. 
Two questions are central: What role 
should gas play in the European Union’s 
future energy mix (also an important point 
for limiting greenhouse gas emissions)? And 
what stance should the European Union 
take towards Putin in a context where Mos-
cow is a strategic partner for resolving 
international crises in other arenas, energy 
security can only be achieved collectively, 
and a decarbonisation partnership with 
Russia would serve the objective of reduc-
ing CO2 emissions? Clean natural gas now 
has a whiff of geopolitics about it. 
The Ukraine crisis will burden the nego-
tiations over energy and climate goals for 
2030. Collateral damage for the ambitious 
climate and renewable energy targets sup-
ported by Germany is becoming apparent, 
because the crisis can be instrumentalised 
by states that prefer, in view of the consid-
erable costs involved for some member 
states, to set less ambitious goals. Yet, geo-
political risks remain a key factor for fossil 
energy supplies, keeping oil and gas prices 
at a high level and always threatening the 
danger of price shocks. To that extent it is 
misleading to focus on energy price dif-
ferences with the United States, which has 
a largely autarchic gas market and increas-
ing domestic oil production. As a net im-
porter, the European Union cannot copy 
that model. 
Diversification is needed, but will be 
costly and only affordable in European 
concert. Renewable energy and efficiency 
improvements are decisive components. 
Before dismissing them as nothing but 
expensive embellishments of climate 
policy, one should remember that one 
quarter of the European Union’s coal im-
ports come from Russia. Russia is also an 
important uranium supplier. Diversifica-
tion would also reap dividends in terms 
of expanded foreign policy leeway. 
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